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Reforming	the	WTO,	part	1:	Why	world	trade	rules	are
looking	shaky
‘Going	WTO’	in	a	no-deal	Brexit	means	that	Britain	would	rely	on	the	rules-based	World	Trade	Organisation	system.
But	the	WTO	is	in	poor	shape,	partly	due	to	tensions	between	the	US	and	China.	In	the	first	of	a	series	of	posts,
Steve	Woolcock	(LSE)	looks	at	why	the	organisation	has	become	weakened.
Even	before	the	coronavirus	pandemic,	the	world	trading	system	was	not	in	great	shape.	Trade	protection	was
averted	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2008	financial	crisis	thanks	to	a	shared	commitment	to	resist	protectionist	responses
on	the	part	of	the	major	trading	powers.	But	over	time,	protectionist	measures	have	grown.	After	years	of	trying,	the
Doha	Development	Agenda	(DDA)	in	the	World	Trade	Organisation	(WTO)	negotiations	effectively	came	to	an	end
in	around	2014	with	no	real	progress.	Then	the	incoming	Trump	administration	initiated	an	aggressive,	unilateral
trade	policy	in	an	attempt	to	force	its	trading	partners	to	make	concessions.
Donald	Trump	arrives	at	the	White	House	in	March	2020.	Photo:White	House.	Public	domain
The	pandemic	is	on	track	to	create	an	economic	recession	on	a	par	with	that	of	the	1930s,	when	beggar-thy-
neighbour	policies	including	trade	protectionism	brought	about	a	collapse	of	the	trading	system.	To	avert	a	similar
outcome,	the	multilateral,	rules-based	trading	system	needs	to	become	more	resilient.
A	multilateral	system	rests	on	the	World	Trade	Organisation	(WTO),	which	is	in	turn	supported	by	three	pillars:	rules
to	provide	the	framework	for	trade	and	investment;	a	mechanism	for	resolving	disputes;	and	procedures	for
monitoring	the	implementation	of	the	core	principles	and	rules.	The	WTO	–	and	the	GATT	before	it	–	have	in	the
past	sought	to	keep	pace	with	developments	in	the	world	economy	by	concluding	large	multilateral	rounds	of
reciprocal	concessions.	The	DDA	was	the	last	such	round,	and	the	first	one	to	fail	since	1945.	It	failed	in	large	part
to	the	difficulty	of	accommodating	economies	at	different	levels	of	development.	Led	by	the	United	States,	in	an
effort	to	prolong	its	ability	to	shape	trade	rules,	and	with	the	support	of	other	OECD	and	partial	support	of	some
non-OECD	economies	including	China,	there	has	been	a	shift	to	a	more	flexible,	plurilateral	approach.
Plurilateral	agreements	are	negotiated	between	like-minded	countries	or	economies	that	tend	to	be	at	similar	levels
of	development	and	on	a	specific	area	of	rule	making	on	which	there	is	broad	measure	of	support.	At	the	WTO
Ministerial	Conference	in	Buenos	Aires	in	November	2017	a	list	of	Joint	Initiative	Studies	was	drawn	up	for
plurilateral	negotiations	on	topics	from	e-commerce	to	investment	facilitation,	environmental	goods	and	fishing
subsidies.	But	there	is	opposition	from	developing	countries	on	the	grounds	that	these	undermine	multilateralism
and	serve	the	interests	of	the	developed	or	power	economies	and	not	those	of	development,	which	was	supposed
to	have	been	the	focus	of	the	DDA.
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With	no	substantial	progress	on	rule	making	since	the	end	of	the	Uruguay	Round	in	the	early	1990s,	when	the	WTO
was	fashioned	from	the	GATT,	tensions	have	grown	over	how	to	interpret	the	rules	that	do	exist.	An	innovation	in
the	WTO	was	the	strengthening	of	dispute	settlement	procedures.	This	included	the	establishment	of	an	Appellate
Body	and	other	means	to	ensure	that	disputes	over	how	the	rules	should	be	applied	were	resolved	by	an
independent,	judicial	process,	rather	than	by	whichever	government	had	the	most	economic	muscle.	As	the	rule
making	lagged	developments	in	the	world	economy,	the	dispute	settlement	pillar	has	had	to	carry	more	of	the	load
of	maintaining	an	open	trading	system.	The	burden	is	also	increased	when	there	are	protectionist	pressures	and
governments	seek	more	autonomy	to	defend	domestic	interests.
This	pillar	of	the	system	is	now	being	violently	shaken	by	the	US,	which	has	blocked	all	appointments	to	the
Appellate	Body	on	the	grounds	that	the	dispute	settlement	system	–	and	the	Appellate	Body	in	particular	–	is	doing
more	than	is	set	out	in	the	1995	Understanding	on	Dispute	Settlement.	This	US	veto	of	new	appointments
effectively	neuters	the	dispute	settlement	system	because	any	party	that	has	a	decision	go	against	it	in	the	main
panel	process	only	needs	to	appeal	the	decision.	With	the	Appellate	Body	out	of	action	nothing	happens	and	the
system	reverts	to	one	in	which	trade	disputes	are	resolved	by	threats	or	the	use	of	power-based	strategies.	That
clearly	favours	the	more	powerful	economies	and	governments	that	are	willing	and	able	to	wield	this	power	–	in
other	words,	the	USA	and	China	and	disadvantages	everyone	else.
The	third	pillar	of	the	WTO	has	been	less	visible,	but	is	no	less	important.	This	is	the	work	done	in	the	WTO	to
continuously	monitor	agreements	and	commitments.	The	credibility	of	any	regime	depends	on	the	principles	and
standards	on	which	agreements	are	based	being	seen	to	be	effectively	implemented.	This	is	particularly	the	case
for	the	rules	on	trade	and	investment	that	concern	‘behind	the	border’	questions,	such	as	the	provision	of	subsidies
or	the	use	of	regulatory	policies	to	distort	competition.	A	‘fair,’	rules-based	trading	system	therefore	relies	on
transparency	in	which	WTO	members	report	on	their	policies	and	make	the	notifications	required	to	show
compliance	with	the	rules.	In	the	WTO	this	reporting	is	monitored	by	a	large	number	of	specialist	committees
covering	tariffs,	customs	procedures,	technical	regulations,	food	safety,	subsidies	to	industry	and	agriculture,
intellectual	property,	the	regulation	of	services	sectors,	government	contracts	etc.	The	task	of	ensuring	compliance
with	reporting	and	notification	requirements	in	the	WTO	has	been	a	long-standing	challenge.	But	progress	has	been
more	difficult,	as	in	the	case	of	the	other	topics	in	the	reform	debate,	because	the	increasingly	tricky	problem	of	how
to	accommodate	countries	at	different	levels	of	development.
A	particular	tension	is	how	to	accommodate	China.	There	are	greater	demands	for	transparency	from	China
because	of	the	scale	and	thus	impact	of	any	national	policy.	This	is	particularly	the	case	for	subsidies,	support	for
state-owned	enterprises	and	its	implementation	of	WTO	rules	on	intellectual	property	right	protection.	For	its	part,
China	sees	these	demands	as	part	of	an	attempt	to	challenge	its	own	model	of	development.	Developing	countries
in	general	argue	that	they	do	not	have	the	resources	for	costly	reporting.
Discussion	of	WTO	reform	is	longstanding,	but	there	is	now	greater	urgency	thanks	to	the	crisis	precipitated	by	US
actions	to	block	appointments	to	the	Appellate	Body.	The	hope,	or	expectation,	was	that	some	progress	could	be
made	at	the	next	WTO	Ministerial	Meeting	in	Kazakhstan	in	June	2020.	The	coronavirus	pandemic	has	resulted	in
the	cancellation	of	this	summit,	but	made	the	need	to	strengthen	the	WTO	even	more	urgent.	In	the	post-1945
period	the	existence	of	the	GATT	and	the	WTO	have	helped	to	avoid	a	repeat	of	a	cycle	of	protectionism.	This	was
evident	after	the	2008	financial	crisis.	Today	we	are	faced	with	an	equally	serious	crisis	–	but	it	comes	at	a	time
when	the	institutional	framework	for	cooperation	in	the	shape	of	the	WTO	faces	unprecedented	challenges.
Over	recent	months	students	studying	for	the	LSE	Masters	in	International	Political	Economy	have	conducted	an
extensive	simulation	of	the	WTO	reform	debate.	This	is	the	first	of	a	series	of	posts	informed	by	these	discussions.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.
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